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I. INTRODUCTION 
While enjoying a home-cooked meal with his family, a father goes 
around the dinner table asking each family member about their day.  His 
eldest son, a junior at the local high school, answers by going through 
some of the mundane details of his day, before beginning to complain 
about his chemistry class and his terrible teacher.  The son then 
exclaims, “My teacher is a dick!  He doesn’t know how to teach.  He is a 
fat ass who just sits in his chair and tells us to read the textbook when 
we have questions.” 
While the language used in the son’s statement is objectionable and 
likely inappropriate for the dinner table, no school would believe that 
they have a right to regulate this private family conversation.  But what 
happens when, later that night, the student uses his home computer to 
access the internet and make similar comments on his personal webpage 
while also suggesting that students protest at school to get the teacher 
fired?  Although the student’s speech occurred in a private setting off 
campus, the internet speech is transferrable and could end up reaching 
the school.  The issue that arises in such a situation relates to the 
school’s authority, if any, to regulate this type of student internet speech. 
The internet is at the frontier of legal analysis and has become a 
source of legal confusion.1  Courts have been perplexed as they attempt 
to apply the First Amendment’s protection of free speech to the 
internet.2  As a borderless medium, the internet does not fit conveniently 
into traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.3  This confusion 
 1. Louis John Seminski, Jr., Note, Tinkering with Student Free Speech: The Internet and the 
Need for a New Standard, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 173 (2001) (“With the advent of the Internet, many 
new free speech issues have come to the forefront of legal analysis.”). 
 2. Id. (“The Internet, however, because of its unique ‘electronic’ nature, does not fit neatly into 
First Amendment precedent regarding free speech or free press.  The Internet exists in cyberspace, 
unlike the tangible material world that we live in, which presents many problems in comparing the 
mediums and using traditional language.” (citation omitted)); see also J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem 
Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863 (Pa. 2002) (“[T]he advent of the Internet has complicated analysis of 
restrictions on speech.”). 
 3. Sandy S. Li, Comment, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The Continued Threat to 
2
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becomes almost insurmountable when the internet is considered in the 
context of a school environment and the traditional student speech 
analysis.4  Despite this confusion, “[t]he First Amendment protection of 
freedom of expression may not be made a casualty of the effort to force-
feed good manners to the ruffians among us.”5 
This Comment addresses the problem created when the traditional 
student speech analysis is applied to student internet speech.  Part II of 
this Comment establishes the basic framework used to allow public 
schools to regulate student speech.  Part II also discusses the public 
schools’ ability to regulate speech that is unprotected by the First 
Amendment as well as the framework developed by the Supreme Court 
to deal with student speech occurring within the school setting.  Part III 
deals with internet speech and the various means the lower courts use to 
determine when schools can punish students for off-campus internet 
speech. 
Part IV of this Comment discusses the problems associated with the 
lower court jurisprudence as well as the solutions proposed by other 
scholars.  Part IV then suggests that the on-campus/off-campus 
dichotomy should not determine a public school’s ability to regulate 
internet speech, but should instead be employed to determine which 
analysis to use.  Part IV further argues that if internet speech can be 
considered on-campus speech, the Supreme Court’s traditional student 
speech framework applies, but if the internet speech is considered off-
campus, courts should use a balancing test to weigh the student’s interest 
in free speech against the school’s interest in regulating that speech.  
Part V concludes that while the new standard appears to broaden the 
public school’s ability to regulate internet speech, the new standard 
actually promotes intellectual honesty, creating an atmosphere that is 
more protective of student speech. 
 
Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 93 (2005) (“The Internet differs from 
other traditional mediums of expression, such as flyers, newspapers, and public speeches, for several 
reasons: (1) it is pervasive, (2) it allows users to disseminate information to millions of people 
immediately and easily, and (3) it can be accessed anywhere.”). 
 4. See Seminski, supra note 1, at 173 (“Adding the school context into the spin only 
complicates matters further.”); see also Caitlin May, Comment, “Internet-Savvy Students” and 
Bewildered Educators: Student Internet Speech is Creating New Legal Issues for the Educational 
Community, 58 CATH. U.L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2009) (“[T]he Internet complicates the traditional student 
speech analysis.”). 
 5. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (D. Me. 1986). 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT AND A STUDENT’S RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH 
The First Amendment states “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”6  Despite this language, the 
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that some categories of 
expression are not protected by the First Amendment.7  By carving out 
categories of unprotected speech, the Court has recognized that the harm 
caused by some forms of speech justify society’s restriction of such 
speech.8  State actors can prevent and punish these limited categories of 
speech—including obscenity, fighting words, and true threats—without 
raising a constitutional problem.9 
As state actors, public schools may punish student speech that falls 
into one of the unprotected categories of speech.  In addition, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that in light of the “special characteristics 
of the school environment,” public schools must also be able to punish 
certain types of student speech.10  With these special circumstances in 
mind, the Court has developed four situations where the school’s 
interests outweigh the student’s interest in free speech.  The remainder 
of this Part elaborates on the development of these situations. 
A. Tinker: Substantial Disruption and Material Interference 
In the seminal student speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,11 the Supreme Court expressly stated that 
“students or teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”12  In Tinker, a group of 
students wore black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War.13  
Upon learning of the plan to wear armbands, the school district’s 
principals instituted a new school policy: any students wearing an 
armband would be asked to remove it, and any students refusing to take 
off the armband would be suspended until they returned to school 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 7. JEROME A. BARRON, C. THOMAS DIENES, WAYNE MCCORMACK, & MARTIN REDISH, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY, CASES AND MATERIALS 957 (7th ed. 2006). 
 8. Id.; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“It has been well 
observed that such utterances [fighting words] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”). 
 9. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
 10. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 504. 
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without wearing the armband.14  Under this policy, a group of students 
were suspended.15  The students brought suit, seeking an injunction 
restraining the school district and its officials from pursuing disciplinary 
actions.16 
In Tinker, the Supreme Court indicated that states and school officials 
have the authority “to prescribe and control conduct in the schools” so 
long as the exercise of power is consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards.17  Recognizing the applicability of the First 
Amendment because the armbands were symbolic speech,18 the Court 
held that teachers and students do not lose their constitutional rights 
when entering the schoolhouse, but these rights must be “applied in light 
of the special characteristics of the school environment.”19  The Court 
stated that a school district must be able to demonstrate that the 
suppression of a student’s opinion is based on reasons other than 
avoiding the discomfort that accompanies an unpopular viewpoint.  
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the prohibition of expression of 
one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to 
avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or 
discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.”20 
Turning to the situation at issue, the Court decided that “the record 
[did] not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school 
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference 
with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school 
premises in fact occurred” as a result of the armbands.21  Because the 
student speech at issue did not create a substantial disruption or material 
interference with schoolwork or discipline, the Court concluded that the 
school district’s disciplinary actions were unconstitutional and remanded 
the case to the lower courts to determine an adequate form of relief.22 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 507. 
 18. Id. at 505–06. 
 19. Id. at 506. 
 20. Id. at 511. 
 21. Id. at 514.  The Court indicated that hostile comments made to the students outside of the 
classroom did not support a finding that the armbands substantially disrupted schoolwork or discipline.  
Id. at 509 (“[O]ur independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school 
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with 
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.  Even an official memorandum 
prepared after the suspension that listed the reasons for the ban on wearing the armbands made no 
reference to the anticipation of such disruption.”). 
 22. Id. at 514. 
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B. Bethel School District: Vulgar, Lewd, and Plainly Offensive Speech 
Tinker’s substantial disruption and material interference analysis 
served as the test for determining whether a student’s speech was 
constitutionally protected until the Court’s decision in Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser.23  In Bethel, the Court was called upon “to 
decide whether the First Amendment prevents a school district from 
disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a school 
assembly.”24  At a school assembly, Fraser used graphic and explicit 
sexual metaphor in a speech nominating another student for an elective 
office.25  As a result, the school’s assistant principal suspended Fraser 
for three days and removed him from the list of potential 
commencement speakers.26  Fraser therefore filed suit, alleging that the 
school district’s disciplinary actions violated his right to freedom of 
speech.27 
In its decision in Bethel, the Supreme Court created an exception to 
the applicability of Tinker, upholding the school district’s sanctions 
because “[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school officials 
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would 
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”28  The Court 
reaffirmed that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are 
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.”29  In recognizing a school’s ability to prohibit the use of 
vulgar and offensive language, the Court considered the traditional role 
public schools play in instilling in children the habits and manners of 
civility and preparing them to play a role in a democratic society.30  The 
Court concluded that “it was perfectly appropriate for the school to 
 23. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 24. Id. at 677. 
 25. Id. at 677–78.  Fraser’s speech included the following statements, which were deemed 
inappropriate by the school: “I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his 
character is firm but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm[;]” “Jeff Kuhlman is 
a man who takes his point and pounds it in.  If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall.  He 
doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds[;]” “Jeff 
is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you[;]” “So vote for 
Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high school can be.”  Id. 
at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
 26. Id. at 678.  “A Bethel High School disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of obscene language 
in the school provides: ‘Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational 
process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.’”  Id. 
 27. Id. at 679. 
 28. Id. at 685.  “The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school 
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”  Id. at 683. 
 29. Id. at 682. 
 30. Id. at 681. 
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disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and 
lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of 
public school education.”31 
C. Hazelwood School District: School-Sponsored Speech 
Two years after Bethel permitted schools to prohibit lewd, offensive, 
and vulgar speech, the Court created a second exception to Tinker in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.32  In Hazelwood, the school’s 
principal removed two pages from an edition of the school newspaper 
published by the journalism class because he objected to two of the 
articles.33  Following this decision, three student-members of the school 
newspaper brought suit.34 
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court held that the school newspaper was 
not a public forum because “[s]chool officials did not evince either ‘by 
policy or by practice’ any intent to open the pages of [the newspaper] to 
‘indiscriminate use’ by its student reporters and editors, or by the student 
body generally.”35  The Court’s conclusion that the school newspaper 
was not a public forum36 allowed school officials to regulate the content 
of the paper in any reasonable manner.37 
After concluding that the school newspaper was not a public forum, 
the Court indicated that schools are not required to affirmatively 
promote particular student speech that occurs during “activities that 
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive 
to bear the imprimatur of the school,” as these events may be 
characterized as part of the curriculum.38  When speech bears the 
 31. Id. at 685–86.  In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan indicated that “[i]f 
respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been 
penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.”  Id. at 688 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
 32. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 33. Id. at 262–64. 
 34. Id. at 262, 264. 
 35. Id. at 270 (citations omitted). 
 36. “First Amendment public forum analysis is a judicial doctrine balancing the public’s free 
speech interests against the government’s proprietary interests over public property.”  Gary E. 
Newberry, Note, Constitutional Law: International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: Is 
the Public Forum a Closed Category?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 155 (1993).  A traditional public forum 
exists where speech occurs “on government property that has traditionally been available for public 
expression.”  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).  See 1 
RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND 
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2.4 (1st ed. Supp. 2009) for a general discussion of the forum analysis 
and how forum analysis applies in the school setting. 
 37. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270. 
 38. Id. at 270–71.  The Court stated that activities may be considered to bear the imprimatur of 
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imprimatur of the school, educators can regulate student speech if the 
regulation is reasonably related to the school’s legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.39 
In applying its new test, the Court concluded that the principal’s 
decision not to publish the two articles and the pages containing those 
articles did not violate the students’ First Amendment rights.40  The 
school newspaper bore the imprimatur of the school because it was part 
of the journalism class curriculum and the Board of Education allocated 
funds for it.41  Since the newspaper bore the imprimatur of the school, 
the principal could regulate its contents pursuant to the school’s 
legitimate pedagogical concerns. 
D. Morse: Speech Promoting Illegal Drug Use 
The Court created a third exception to Tinker in Morse v. Frederick.42  
In Morse, a student and his friends displayed a banner stating “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS” during the Olympic Torch Relay.43  Upon seeing the 
banner, the principal demanded that it be taken down because it violated 
a school policy prohibiting expression advocating the use of substances 
illegal to minors.44  After Frederick, a student, refused to comply with 
the principal’s request, the principal confiscated the banner and 
suspended Frederick for ten days.45  Subsequently, Frederick filed suit. 
In Morse, the Supreme Court created a third exception to Tinker, 
concluding that “a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, 
restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably 
viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”46  Both the Court and Congress47 
the school and thus be part of the school curriculum, “whether or not they occur in a traditional 
classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular 
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.”  Id. 
 39. Id. at 273. 
 40. Id. at 276. 
 41. See id. at 262–63. 
 42. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 43. Id. at 397. 
 44. Id. at 398. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 403. 
 47. As the Court noted: 
  Congress has declared that part of a school’s job is educating students about the 
dangers of illegal drug use.  It has provided billions of dollars to support state and local 
drug-prevention programs, and required that schools receiving federal funds under the 
Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 certify that their drug-
prevention programs “convey a clear and consistent message that . . . the illegal use of 
drugs [is] wrong and harmful.” 
8
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recognized the state has a compelling interest in deterring drug use by 
students and “part of a school’s job is educating students about the 
dangers of illegal drug use.”48  Because preventing student drug use is 
part of the school’s mission, “[s]tudent speech celebrating illegal drug 
use at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and 
teachers, thus poses a particular challenge for school officials working to 
protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.”49  
Justice Alito’s concurrence is a key limiting vote50 in the Morse 
decision: he joined the majority’s opinion 
on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold that a public 
school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any 
restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on 
any political or social issue, including speech on issues such as “the 
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal 
use.”51 
In addressing Frederick’s case, the Court first determined that the 
banner constituted on-campus speech because it occurred during school 
hours, at an event sanctioned by the school, where teachers and 
administrators supervised the students.52  The Court then examined the 
cryptic message on the banner and concluded that it was reasonable for 
the principal to interpret the message as promoting illegal drug use.53  
Under the new test, because Frederick’s speech could be reasonably 
construed as promoting illegal drug use, the Court held that the 
Id. at 408 (internal citations omitted). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 408. 
 50. See Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., A Foot in the Door? The Unwitting Move Towards a “New” 
Student Welfare Standard in Student Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 1221, 1226 
(2009) (“Perhaps even more telling than the majority opinion is the Alito and Kennedy concurrence in 
Morse.”); see also Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2007) (referring to 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion as “controlling”).  But see Nuxoll ex. rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie 
Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008) (Justices Alito and Kennedy “joined the majority 
opinion, not just the decision, and by doing so they made it a majority opinion” not a plurality opinion). 
 51. Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 400–01 (majority opinion). 
 53. Id. at 401–02. 
At least two interpretations of the words on the banner demonstrate that the sign 
advocated the use of illegal drugs.  First, the phrase could be interpreted as an imperative: 
“[Take] bong hits . . .”—a message equivalent, as Morse explained in her declaration, to 
“smoke marijuana” or “use an illegal drug.”  Alternatively, the phrase could be viewed as 
celebrating drug use—“bong hits [are a good thing],” or “[we take] bong hits”—and we 
discern no meaningful distinction between celebrating illegal drug use in the midst of 
fellow students and outright advocacy or promotion. 
Id. at 402. 
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principal’s actions did not violate the First Amendment.54 
In summation, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence divides student 
speech into four categories.  Originally, all student speech was governed 
by Tinker.  Under Tinker, schools can only regulate student speech 
reasonably calculated to cause a substantial disruption or material 
interference with school activities.  Bethel limits Tinker’s applicability 
by allowing schools to regulate lewd, vulgar, or plainly offensive student 
speech without forecasting disruption.  The Hazelwood Court 
distinguished individual student speech on school premises from school-
sponsored speech and held that school officials may regulate student 
speech if it is reasonably perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school.  
Finally, Morse permits schools to regulate student speech that may 
reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal drug use.55  Although 
Morse provides a new analysis, lower courts are still deciding how 
Morse fits into the framework.56 
III. CHAOS IN THE LOWER COURTS: ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE WHEN 
STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH IS SUBJECT TO PUNISHMENT AT SCHOOL 
Students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech 
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”57  As one scholar has pointed 
out, the negative inference of this passage “implies that outside those 
gates, the school should have no power to regulate student speech.”58  
The Supreme Court has not needed to address a school district’s ability 
to regulate speech occurring off campus because the student speech 
framework cases all dealt with on-campus speech.  Because the speech 
unequivocally occurred within the schoolhouse gates, the school’s 
authority to punish such speech was not in question.59  In contrast, 
student internet speech often cannot be considered to have occurred 
within the gates of the schoolhouse.60  With this in mind, before the 
 54. Id. at 403. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Conn. 2007) (In 
Morse, “the Supreme Court extended Fraser to cover on-campus speech that school administrators 
could reasonably interpret as advocating the use of drugs, a message ‘clearly disruptive of and 
inconsistent with the school’s educational mission to educate students about the dangers of illegal drugs 
and to discourage their use.’” (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 399)), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 57. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 58. Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHITS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public School Authority 
over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1206, 1223 
(2008). 
 59. Id. at 1224. 
 60. Id. (“In cases involving student cyberspeech, however, it is rarely clear that the speech at 
issue occurs within [its] gates.”).  “A student who comes to school the morning after creating a website 
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traditional student speech analysis is applied to off-campus student 
internet speech, it must be determined that the school’s regulatory power 
encompasses it.61 
While recognizing that internet speech is protected by the First 
Amendment, the law is unsettled regarding the amount of protection 
afforded to off-campus student internet speech.62  As a result of this 
uncertainty, courts have established different methods for determining 
when student internet speech is subject to a school’s disciplinary regime.  
One approach requires that internet speech fall into the category of on-
campus speech before a school can regulate it.63  If the internet speech is 
classified as off-campus speech, schools can only punish the speech if it 
falls into one of the unprotected categories such as obscenity, fighting 
words, and true threats.64  Despite the apparent simplicity of the on-
campus/off-campus dichotomy, courts have differed with respect to the 
analysis used to determine whether student internet speech is considered 
on- or off-campus speech.65  Another approach categorically applies the 
Tinker analysis to off-campus internet speech.66  This Part analyzes the 
various approaches taken by lower courts. 
A. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals requires that speech be 
categorized as on-campus speech before schools can regulate it.  In order 
to determine when off-campus speech may be considered on-campus 
speech, the Seventh Circuit has established what one scholar called the 
“place of reception standard.”67 
In Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield, a 
on her home computer does not bring the site with her, attached to her person.”  Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1214–15. 
 63. See Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998); 
J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002); Wisniewski v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 64. See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1372–73 (S.D. Fla. 2010); see also supra notes 7–
9 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Boucher, 134 F.3d at 829 (indicating that where speech was disseminated determines 
whether speech is categorized as “on-campus”); Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 865 (holding 
that school’s ability to regulate off-campus speech depends on whether the speech had sufficient 
connections to the school environment); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40 (indicating that analysis of 
school’s ability to regulate turns on whether it was foreseeable that the off-campus speech would create 
a disruption on campus). 
 66. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010), 
vacated, reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 67. Erin Reeves, Note, The “Scope of a Student”: How to Analyze Student Speech in the Age of 
the Internet, 42 GA. L. REV. 1127, 1148–49 (2008). 
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student contributor for an underground newspaper published off campus 
wrote an article about hacking the school’s computers.68  The 
underground newspaper was distributed at school.69  The student author, 
who was suspended and ultimately expelled for writing the article,70 
brought suit and was granted a preliminary injunction by the district 
court.71  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary 
injunction.72  In doing so, the court held that the traditional student 
expression framework applied because the newspaper was distributed on 
campus.73  The court focused on where the speech was ultimately 
disseminated, not where it originated.74 
The Seventh Circuit’s “place of reception standard” has been 
criticized as establishing a low threshold for when off-campus speech 
can be considered on-campus speech, especially when applied to student 
internet speech.75  One problem with the standard is that one unilateral 
action by a third party could result in a student’s off-campus internet 
speech falling subject to the school’s jurisdiction.  For example, a fellow 
student accessing the internet speech from a school computer would 
bring the speech under the school’s jurisdiction.  In addition, this 
threshold can easily be manipulated by administrators or a student’s 
enemies to bring the speech into the realm of on-campus speech.76 
B. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also requires speech to be 
categorized as on-campus speech before schools can regulate it.  In order 
to determine when off-campus speech may be considered on-campus 
speech, the court developed the sufficient nexus test, which looks at 
whether the off-campus speech has sufficient connections with the 
school before it can be considered on-campus speech. 
In J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,77 an eighth 
grade student was expelled as a result of a website he created on his 
 68. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 822. 
 69. Id. (The newspaper was distributed “in bathrooms, in lockers and in the cafeteria at 
Greenfield.”). 
 70. Id. at 823. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 829. 
 73. Id.  “The court focused not on whether the speech was produced on- or off-campus, but 
whether it was received in an on- or off-campus context.”  Reeves, supra note 67, at 1148. 
 74. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 829. 
 75. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1149. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 757 A.2d 412 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), aff’d, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
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home computer outside of school hours.78  The website was entitled 
“Teacher Sux” and contained web pages with derogatory remarks about 
faculty members at the student’s school.79  The website’s pages 
contained offensive language and graphic images of violence directed 
toward the school’s staff.80 
One of the teachers received an anonymous e-mail about the website 
and reported it to the principal.81  Investigations by the police and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation identified J.S. as the website’s creator.82  
J.S. was ultimately expelled,83 and his parents filed suit. 
Citing the broad discretion given to a school’s disciplinary policies, 
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Court of 
Common Pleas’ decision to uphold J.S.’s expulsion.84  In addressing 
J.S.’s First Amendment claim, the court acknowledged that J.S.’s speech 
“occurred off of school premises and was communicated to others via 
the Internet.”85  The court looked to precedent to determine “whether a 
student may be disciplined for conduct occurring off of school 
premises.”86  Interpreting these cases, the court concluded “courts have 
allowed school officials to discipline students for conduct occurring off 
of [campus] premises where it is established that the conduct materially 
and substantially interferes with the educational process.”87  In other 
words, the court held that off-campus speech can be punished under 
Tinker.  In applying the substantial and material interference standard to 
 78. Id. at 415, 417. 
 79. Id. at 415. 
 80. Id. at 415–17.  The web pages contained curse words including “fuck” and “bitch.”  Id. at 
416.  In addition, one web page contained “a diagram of [a teacher] with her head cut off and blood 
dripping from her neck,” while also soliciting money to hire a hitman to kill her.  Id.  Visitors to the 
website had to agree to a disclaimer before they could access the website.  Id. at 415 (“The disclaimer 
indicated, inter alia, that the visitor was not a member of the School District’s faculty or administration 
and that the visitor did not intend to disclose the identity of the web-site creator or intend to cause 
trouble for that individual.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 415. 
 83. Id. at 417. 
 84. Id. at 417, 426. 
 85. Id. at 419. 
 86. Id. at 419–21 (citing Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995); Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. 
Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 
1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998)).  But see Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting 
Student Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 167 (2003) (“A more thorough analysis of these 
decisions, however, suggests that they do not in fact support the J.S. court’s conclusion: the J.S. court 
misinterpreted one of these decisions, and the other two decisions were themselves of debatable value or 
distinguishable from the situation faced by the J.S. court.  In short, it seems more likely that the J.S. 
court used the decisions to attempt to legitimize its holding as being grounded in the law rather than 
public policy.”). 
 87. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d at 421. 
13
Patrick: THE CIVILITY-POLICE: THE RISING NEED TO BALANCE STUDENTS’ RIGHTS
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
PATRICK FINAL Format (Paginated) 3/18/2011  1:31:51 PM 
868 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
the facts of the case, the court determined that the evidence indicated the 
website hindered the educational process.88 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the lower 
court’s decision, but justified the school’s punishment in an alternative 
manner.  Before considering the applicability of the student speech 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania examined whether 
J.S.’s speech constituted an unprotected true threat and concluded it did 
not.89 
The court held that it needed to conduct a two-step inquiry to 
determine whether the traditional student speech case law applied.  As a 
threshold issue the speech’s location must be determined: “[I]s it on 
campus speech or purely off-campus speech?”90  If it is considered on-
campus speech, the court considers other factors, including the speech’s 
form, effect, and setting, as well as “whether the speech is part of a 
school sponsored expressive activity.”91 
In addressing the threshold inquiry, the court developed a sufficient 
nexus approach: where speech that originates off campus is aimed at a 
specific school or its staff, brought onto the school’s campus, or 
accessed at the school by its originator, the speech is to be considered 
on-campus speech for purposes of First Amendment analysis.92  
Applying this analysis to J.S.’s speech, the court concluded there was a 
sufficient nexus between the website and the school to constitute on-
campus speech.93  The court considered the fact that J.S. had accessed 
the website on a school computer, showed the site to another student 
while on campus, and discussed the website with other students.94 
Concluding that J.S.’s internet website constituted on-campus speech, 
the court moved on to the second step of the inquiry.  Although J.S.’s 
speech did not fall neatly under any one test, the court attempted to 
apply Fraser and Tinker.95  The court ultimately concluded that the 
 88. Id.  The court indicated that one teacher had to take medical leave based on the website’s 
content and that the website’s statements had a negative effect on other students’ perceptions of the 
teachers involved.  Id.  In upholding J.S.’s expulsion, the court also recognized that schools are justified 
in taking threats of school violence seriously, as they have become commonplace.  Id. at 422. 
 89. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 856–59 (Pa. 2002).  After 
considering “the statements, the context in which they were made, the reaction of listeners and others as 
well as the nature of the comments,” the court concluded J.S.’s statements did not constitute a true threat 
and turned to determining the applicability of the student speech jurisprudence.  Id. at 858–60. 
 90. Id. at 864. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 865. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  Faculty members and administrators had also accessed the website on campus.  Id. 
 95. Id. at 865–68. 
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website created a substantial disruption in the school.96  It found that the 
educational process was disrupted because one teacher had to miss class, 
which required using substitute teachers.97  In addition, the court 
indicated that several students visited counselors and expressed 
anxiety.98  The court found yet another disruption based on the parents 
voicing their displeasure with the situation.99 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s opinion is important for two 
reasons.  First, it reinforces that schools may punish students for speech 
that is categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.  Second, the 
court recognized the school’s authority to discipline internet speech once 
it determined that the speech could be considered on-campus speech.100 
C. Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Second Circuit has had two opportunities to address off-campus 
student internet speech.  In the first case, the Second Circuit indicated 
that if it was reasonably foreseeable that off-campus speech would reach 
the school, the speech could be regulated under Tinker.  One year later, 
the Second Circuit applied this framework in a subsequent case.  Both 
cases will be addressed below. 
1. Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School 
District101 
In Wisniewski, a middle school student created an image with a pistol 
firing a bullet into a person’s head; the image displayed the words “Kill 
Mr. VanderMolen,” who was a teacher at the middle school.102  The 
image was used as an icon on the student’s AOL Instant Messaging (IM) 
messages.103  When the student sent an AOL IM,104 the icon helped 
 96. Id. at 869. 
 97. Id.  The school district’s findings indicated that “Mrs. Fulmer has had lasting effects from 
viewing the Web page, including stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, loss of weight, and a 
general sense of lost well-being,” that “Mrs. Fulmer’s lifestyle has changed dramatically,” that “Mrs. 
Fulmer has suffered headaches, takes Zanac as an anti-anxiety/anti-depressant, and was unable to return 
to school at the end of the year,” and that “Mrs. Fulmer has applied for a medical sabbatical leave for the 
1998–99 school year because of her inability to return to teaching.”  J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area 
Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416–17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), aff’d, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
 98. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 869. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1144. 
 101. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 102. Id. at 36. 
 103. Id. at 35–36. 
 104. As the Second Circuit noted: 
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identify the student as the sender.105  The student created and 
transmitted the icon off campus and did not send it to the teacher or any 
other school official.106  However, another student informed the teacher 
about the icon and provided him with a copy of it, which was later 
passed on to the principals and th 107
Upon receipt of the icon, the school questioned the student and 
suspended him for five days.108  The police also investigated the matter 
and concluded that the student meant the icon as a joke, and he did not 
pose any threat to the teacher.109  After the student served his 
suspension, the superintendent appointed a hearing officer to determine 
whether the student should receive a long-term suspension.110  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer recommended to the Board 
of Education a one semester suspension, which the Board approved.111  
The student filed suit against the school district.112 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[t]he fact that [the 
student’s] creation and transmission of the IM icon occurred away from 
school property does not necessarily insulate him from school 
discipline.”113  The Second Circuit concluded “that off-campus conduct 
can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a 
school,”114 which allows school officials to regulate the speech 
consistent with Tinker.115  In this case, the court concluded that the 
Instant messaging enables a person using a computer with Internet access to exchange 
messages in real time with members of a group (usually called “buddies” in IM lingo) 
who have the same IM software on their computers.  Instant messaging permits rapid 
exchanges of text between any two members of a “buddy list” who happen to be on-line 
at the same time.  Different IM programs use different notations for indicating which 
members of a user’s “buddy list” are on-line at any one time.  Text sent to and from a 
“buddy” remains on the computer screen during the entire exchange of messages between 
any two users of the IM program. 
Id. at 35. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 36. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  A psychologist also concluded that the icon was meant as a joke and not an actual threat.  
Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 37. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 39. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 38.  “With respect to school officials’ authority to discipline a student’s expression 
reasonably understood as urging violent conduct, we think the appropriate First Amendment standard is 
the one set forth by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District . . . .”  Id. 
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student’s conduct “pose[d] a reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon 
would come to the attention of school authorities and that it would 
‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school.’”116  The court concluded it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
icon would reach school authorities.117  Based on the facts of the case, 
the court concluded that the First Amendment claims were properly 
dismissed.118 
At a minimum, Wisniewski indicates that a school district can punish 
speech that occurs entirely off campus.  In order for a school district to 
be able to punish such speech, it must be reasonably foreseeable that the 
speech would reach school property.119  Wisniewski does not address 
which traditional student speech tests are applicable to off-campus 
speech, but it does imply that a school district can punish student off-
campus speech under Tinker’s substantial disruption and material 
interference test. 
2. Doninger v. Niehoff 
The Doninger line of cases allowed the Second Circuit to flesh out 
Wisniewski’s meaning.  Doninger, a high school student, was punished 
for a posting made on livejournal.com.120  As a member of student 
council, Doninger was responsible for planning a battle of the bands 
concert, which having been previously delayed, now faced further 
delay.121  Upset by the potential delay, four student council members 
used the school computers to access one of their parent’s e-mail 
accounts and send a mass e-mail encouraging local citizens to contact 
the superintendent about the problem.122  Flooded with responses to the 
e-mail, the principal met with Doninger and offered her opinions 
 116. Id. at 38–39 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969)). 
 117. Id. at 39.  The Second Circuit could not unanimously decide whether it must be shown that 
the speech was reasonably foreseeable to reach school property or whether the fact that it reached the 
school eliminates the need to inquire into foreseeability.  Id. 
 118. Id. at 40. 
 119. Id. at 39. 
 120. Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203, 206–08 (D. Conn. 2007), 
aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 121. Id. at 203.  Jamfest, the battle of the bands concert, had been postponed twice and “was 
scheduled to take place on April 28, 2007.”  However, the teacher responsible for the auditorium was 
not available to work on that day, which forced the principal to either have the students reschedule the 
event or hold the event in the cafeteria.  Unbeknownst to the students, a Board of Education policy 
required the teacher’s presence at all events in the auditorium.  Id. 
 122. Id. at 204–05.  Doninger claimed that their faculty advisor suggested sending a mass e-mail 
to the taxpayers, but the advisor adamantly rejected making such a suggestion.  Id. at 204.  Based on the 
testimony heard, the court concluded that the advisor’s version of the events was most credible.  Id. 
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regarding the corrective actions that should be taken.123  Later that 
evening, Doninger posted an entry to her livejournal.com blog regarding 
the concert.124  The blog entry was critical of the administration’s 
reaction to the students’ concerns about the concert and encouraged 
others to contact the office to anger the administration.125  A few weeks 
later, when the administration discovered the blog entry, Doninger was 
prohibited from running for senior class secretary.126  Despite winning 
as a write-in candidate,127 Doninger was not permitted to hold the office 
and another student assumed the position.128  Doninger’s mother 
brought suit claiming violation of her daughter’s First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights129 and seeking a preliminary injunction requiring the 
school to hold a new election for senior class secretary in which she 
would be able to run.130 
The District Court of Connecticut found that Doninger failed to 
establish a likelihood of success on the merits and therefore denied her 
motion for preliminary injunction.131  The court concluded that 
 123. Id.  The principal “told [Doninger] that using the school computer system to send a personal 
email violated the school’s internet policy, and that in general, the students had failed to act in a manner 
appropriate to class officers.”  Id. at 205. 
 124. Id. at 206 (“Livejournal.com is an online community that allows its members to post their 
own blog entries and comment on the blog entries of others.  One need not be a registered member of 
the community to view the webpages, unless a blogger has adjusted her privacy settings to restrict 
access, in which case it is possible to view the blog only if the author has previously added the viewer to 
her ‘friends’ list.  A privacy setting is also available that restricts access to the author alone.  At the time 
[Doninger] posted her blog entry, her privacy setting was ‘public,’ and [Doninger] understood that this 
meant that anyone could view the webpage.  The content of the message itself suggests that her purpose 
was in fact to encourage her fellow students to read and respond to the blog . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 125. Id.  In pertinent part, the blog entry stated: 
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. . . . basically, because we sent 
[the original Jamfest email] out, [the superintendent] is getting a TON of phone calls and 
emails and such. . . . however, she got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole 
thing all together, anddd [sic] so basically we aren’t going to have it at all, but in the 
slightest chance we do[,] it is going to be after the talent show on may 18th. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126. Id. at 207–08. 
 127. Id. at 208.  In an issue related to this case, but not related to this Comment, the school 
prohibited students from wearing “Team Avery” t-shirts into the election assembly.  Id.  This issue 
raises other student free speech concerns. 
 128. Id. at 208–09. 
 129. Id. at 202, 211 (Doninger “argues that her First Amendment rights were violated in the 
following ways: (1) when she was prevented from running for Senior Class Secretary; (2) when she was 
not permitted to wear a ‘Team Avery’ t-shirt into the auditorium on May 25, 2007; and (3) when she 
was not permitted to give a speech at the May 25, 2007 assembly.”).  Because this Comment focuses on 
student internet speech, Doninger’s other First Amendment claims are not addressed.  For the same 
reason, Doninger’s Equal Protection claim will not be addressed. 
 130. Id. at 202. 
 131. Id. at 218, 220. 
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Doninger’s speech was created off campus but was “purposely designed 
by [Doninger] to come onto the campus.”132  The district court reiterated 
the Second Circuit’s holding in Wisniewski that when off-campus speech 
affects the school in a reasonably foreseeable manner, the speech “may 
be considered on-campus speech for the purposes of the First 
Amendment.”133  Because the speech was deemed on-campus speech for 
First Amendment purposes, the school could regulate the speech based 
on the traditional student speech framework.134  With this in mind, the 
district court indicated that Fraser permits school officials to punish 
offensive speech, such as that contained in Doninger’s blog,135 and 
Doninger was therefore unlikely to succeed on the merits.136 
Doninger appealed the district court’s decision, but the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction.137  The 
Second Circuit reiterated its holding from Wisniewski “that a student 
may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off 
school grounds, when this conduct ‘would foreseeably create a risk of 
substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at least when it 
was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also 
reach campus.”138  The Second Circuit applied the Wisniewski 
framework and concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
online post would reach school property139 and that once there it would 
create a risk of substantial disruption.140  Because Doninger’s speech 
 132. Id. at 216. 
 133. Id. at 217; see also id. at 217 n.11 (“At oral argument, [Doninger’s] counsel suggested that 
the holding in Wisniewski should be limited to the Tinker framework; that is, that off-campus speech 
directly affecting the school in a reasonably foreseeable manner could only be analyzed under the Tinker 
rubric for on-campus speech.  The Court, however, does not read Wisniewski to be so limited, and in fact 
sees no reason to deny the application of Fraser to off-campus speech that affects the school in a 
reasonably foreseeable manner and that would otherwise be analyzed under Fraser had it actually 
occurred on-campus.”). 
 134. See id. at 216–17. 
 135. Id. at 217. 
 136. Id. at 218. 
 137. Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 138. Id. at 48 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 
(2d Cir. 2007)). 
 139. Id. at 50.  In making this determination, the Second Circuit looked at the fact that Doninger 
designed the speech to disseminate onto campus, that the posting pertained to events at the school, and 
that Doninger’s intent was to encourage other students to act.  Id. 
 140. Id.  “There are three factors in particular on which we rely to reach this conclusion.  First, the 
language with which [Doninger] chose to encourage others to contact the administration was not only 
plainly offensive, but also potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing controversy.”  Id. at 
50–51.  “Second, and perhaps more significantly, [Doninger’s] post used the ‘at best misleading and at 
wors[t] false’ information that Jamfest had been cancelled in her effort to solicit more calls and emails 
to” the superintendent.  Id. at 51.  “Moreover, [Doninger] and the other students who participated in 
writing the mass email were called away either from class or other activities on the morning of April 25 
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could be regulated under the Tinker standard, the Second Circuit did not 
decide whether the scope of Fraser encompassed off-campus speech,141 
although it did indicate its reluctance to apply Fraser to Doninger’s off-
campus speech.142 
Although the preliminary injunction was denied, the case proceeded.  
The district court partially granted summary judgment for the 
defendants.143  Although the Second Circuit was unwilling to address 
Fraser’s applicability to the case, the district court stated that until the 
Second Circuit overrules its position, “the [c]ourt does not believe there 
is any reason to change its position that Ms. Doninger’s First 
Amendment rights were not violated.”144 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the creation 
and transmission of internet speech off campus does not always insulate 
the student from school discipline.145  If it is reasonably foreseeable that 
off-campus internet speech will reach school authorities and create a risk 
of substantial disruption, the off-campus speech is actually on-campus 
speech that can be regulated under Tinker.146  The Second Circuit has 
not yet determined whether the reasonable foreseeability test allows a 
school district to regulate off-campus student speech under the other 
student speech tests.147  However, at least one district court appears 
willing to permit schools to regulate off-campus student speech under 
Fraser when it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the 
school campus.148 
D. Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has placed less emphasis on 
whether the off-campus student internet speech can be considered on-
because of the need to manage the growing dispute . . . .”  Id. 
 141. Id. at 50.  “We need not conclusively determine Fraser’s scope, however, to be satisfied that 
[Doninger’s] posting—in which she called school administrators ‘douchebags’ and encouraged others to 
contact [the superintendent]‘to piss her off more’—contained the sort of language that properly may be 
prohibited in schools.”  Id. at 49.  “We therefore need not decide whether other standards may apply 
when considering the extent to which a school may discipline off-campus speech.”  Id. 
 142. Id. at 49–50. 
 143. Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (D. Conn. 2009).  The court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants on Doninger’s First Amendment claim because the defendants were entitled 
to qualified immunity.  Id. at 221. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
 146. Id. at 39–40. 
 147. See Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 148. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 221. 
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campus speech.  In contrast to the off-campus/on-campus approach, the 
Third Circuit has held that all off-campus internet speech can be 
regulated under Tinker. 
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, two students 
created a fake MySpace profile of their principal, Mr. McGonigle.149  
The profile, which included the principal’s picture, referenced him as a 
pedophile and sex addict.150  Although the profile was allegedly set to a 
private setting shortly after its creation, the profile became a topic of 
much conversation within the school.151  After receiving a print-out of 
the profile, the principal called one of the students, J.S., to his office.152  
During this meeting, J.S. confessed to creating the profile and was 
subsequently suspended for ten days.153  J.S.’s parents filed suit alleging 
violations of their daughter’s First Amendment rights and their own 
constitutional rights to direct the upbringing of their child.154 
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant.155  In 
doing so, the court concluded that the speech was “akin to the lewd and 
vulgar speech” in Fraser.156  The court also noted that the speech could 
have resulted in criminal prosecution.157  The court held that the school 
could punish the student’s off-campus creation when the off-campus 
speech had an effect on campus.158  Because the court found the 
connection between the off-campus action and the on-campus effect, the 
school’s punishment was constitutional.159  The parental rights claim 
 149. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 08-
4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at *1–2. 
 152. Id. at *2. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at *3. 
 155. Id. at *9. 
 156. Id. at *6. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at *7. 
 159. Id. 
  The facts that we are presented with establish much more of a connection between the 
off-campus action and on-campus effect.  The website addresses the principal of the 
school.  Its intended audience is students at the school.  A paper copy of the website was 
brought into school, and the website was discussed in school.  The picture on the profile 
was appropriated from the school district’s website.  Plaintiff crafted the profile out of 
anger at the principal for punishment the plaintiff had received at school for violating the 
dress code.  J.S. lied in school to the principal about the creation of the imposter profile.  
Moreover, although a substantial disruption so as to fall under Tinker did not 
occur . . . there was in fact some disruption during school hours.  Additionally, the profile 
was viewed at least by the principal at school and a paper copy of the profile was brought 
into school.  On these facts, and because the lewd and vulgar off-campus speech had an 
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was rejected because J.S.’s activities “were not merely personal home 
activities.”160 
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants.161  The 
Third Circuit recognized the need to balance “the protected nature of 
off-campus student speech” against the school’s interest in preventing 
speech that creates a substantial disruption with school functions.162  
With this in mind, the Third Circuit created a categorical exception to 
the on-campus requirement.163  The Third Circuit held “off-campus 
speech that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a substantial 
disruption of or material interference with a school need not satisfy any 
geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant to Tinker.”164  
In this case, the court held that but for the quick corrective actions taken 
by the principal, the profile would have created a reasonable possibility 
of disruption.165 
Schools within the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction can regulate on- and 
off-campus student speech under Tinker.166  Having created a 
categorical exception for Tinker’s application, which governed the 
current case, the Third Circuit declined to determine “whether a school 
official may discipline a student for her lewd, vulgar, or offensive off-
campus speech that has an effect o 167
E. United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
has established a hybrid approach.  This approach embraces the 
effect on-campus, we find no error in the school administering discipline to J.S. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 160. Id. at *9. 
 161. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 
reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 162. Id. at 299. 
 163. Id. at 301. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 300 (“[T]he profile presented a reasonable possibility of a future disruption, which was 
preempted only by McGonigle’s expeditious investigation of the profile, which secured its quick 
removal, and his swift punishment of its creators.”). 
 166. One scholar has recognized that Tinker’s language seems to permit regulation of off-campus 
speech that created a substantial disruption within the school.  Kara D. Williams, Comment, Public 
Schools vs. MySpace and Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 707, 712 (2008) (“For off-campus speech, . . . Tinker is probably the only ruling that may be 
applied; recall that in Tinker, the Supreme Court expressly referred to speech occurring ‘in class or out 
of it.’”). 
 167. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298. 
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traditional on-campus/off-campus dichotomy while at the same time it 
recognizes that off-campus speech may potentially be regulated under 
Tinker. 
In Evans v. Bayer,168 a senior created a Facebook group entitled, “Ms. 
Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met,” which served as a place 
for students to voice their grievances.169  The student made a posting 
stating: “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met!  To those 
select students who have had the displeasure of having Ms. Sarah 
Phelps, or simply knowing her and her insane antics: Here is the place to 
express your feelings of hatred.”170  The group was created after school 
hours from a home computer; the postings were never seen by the 
teacher; there was no threat of violence or disruption at school; and the 
posting was removed after two days.171 
The principal found out about the posting, suspended the student, and 
forced her to take fewer advanced placement courses.172  The student 
brought suit against the principal for violations of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and sought an injunction and nominal 
damages.173  The principal filed a motion to dismiss, which the district 
court denied with respect to the nominal damages because the principal 
was not entitled to qualified immunity.174  In determining that the 
defendant violated the Constitution, the district court synthesized the 
various Supreme Court and circuit court rulings in order to establish a 
basic framework.175  First, the location of the speech “should be 
determined at the outset in order to decide whether the ‘unique 
concerns’ of the school environment are implicated.”176  On-campus 
speech can be regulated according to the student expression standards.  
The district court indicated that “[s]tudent off-campus speech, though 
generally protected, could be subject to analysis under the Tinker 
standard . . . if the speech raises on-campus concerns.”177  In addition, 
 168. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365(S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 169. Id. at 1367. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1377.  “To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant 
violated a constitutional right, and (2) that this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged 
violation.”  Id. at 1369.  The district court granted the motion to dismiss regarding the injunction 
because an officer sued in his or her individual capacity could not be ordered to perform the injunction’s 
mandate.  Id. 
 175. Id. at 1369–73. 
 176. Id. at 1370 (citing J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002)). 
 177. Id. (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010), 
vacated, reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010)). 
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off-campus speech can be disciplined by the schools if it is unprotected 
speech.178 
The district court determined that the student’s speech was off-
campus speech.179  In making this determination, the court rejected the 
argument that the mere fact that the speech’s intended audience was the 
school, was by itself, enough to label the speech as occurring on 
campus.180  The district court concluded that the student’s off-campus 
speech could not be viewed as creating a well-founded expectation of 
disruption, precluding Tinker’s application.181  The district court also 
rejected the principal’s argument that no constitutional violation existed 
because the principal could punish the off-campus speech under 
Fraser.182  After determining that the principal violated the student’s 
constitutional rights, the district court indicated that the law was clearly 
established and denied the principal’s motion to dismiss the claim for 
nominal damages.183 
IV. CALMING THE CHAOS: COURTS MUST BALANCE ANY COMPELLING 
INTEREST THE SCHOOL HAS IN PUNISHING OFF-CAMPUS INTERNET SPEECH 
AGAINST STUDENTS’ RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts 
have struggled to apply the current student speech framework to student 
internet speech.184  The lack of guidance has created numerous 
problems.  First, the lower courts inconsistently apply the existing 
student speech framework and reach different conclusions.185  Further 
complicating the problem is that “courts have interpreted differently the 
distinction between on-campus and off-campus speech, with some 
courts defining on-campus speech much more expansively than other 
courts.”186 
This inconsistency creates other problems.  Without an adequate 
 178. Id. 1372. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1371. 
 181. Id. at 1373.  “[T]he key is whether the school administrators have a well-founded belief that a 
‘substantial’ disruption will occur.”  Id. 
 182. Id. at 1374.  “Fraser’s First Amendment rights were circumscribed in light of the school 
environment in which the speech occurred.  For the Court to equate a school assembly to the entire 
internet would set a precedent too far reaching.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 183. Id. at 1377. 
 184. See Williams, supra note 166, at 719 (“The Supreme Court has never addressed student 
Internet speech specifically, and it is difficult for lower courts to apply the existing framework to [these] 
type of cases.”). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 720. 
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framework, school districts lack adequate guidance in crafting 
policies187 and in disciplining student internet speech.188  In order to 
effectively administer their schools, public school officials 
must be able to determine (1) when student Internet speech created off-
campus may be considered on-campus speech and (2) when student 
Internet speech constitutes a material and substantial disruption if the 
students cannot access the speech from school.  Public schools must be 
capable of making these determinations with certainty, or schools may 
continue punishing students for speech protected by the First 
Amendment.189 
The lack of clear guidelines results not only in the punishment of 
protected speech, but the uncertainty also increases the amount of 
litigation.190  Instead of focusing on educating, administrators 
continuously have to defend against lawsuits. 
If schools are uncertain regarding what student internet speech they 
may regulate, it follows that students are inherently unsure of when they 
will be subject to their school’s jurisdiction.191  Without notice of when 
their internet speech will be subject to punishment at school, students are 
unable to appropriately censor themselves from making improper 
statements online.192  Students may therefore refrain from expressing 
 187. Id. at 724; see also Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for 
Public School Jurisdiction over Students’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1566–67 (2009) (“In 
order for schools to draft appropriate policies in compliance with cyberbullying statutes, school officials 
need clarity on the boundaries of their authority over online activity and the extent to which the First 
Amendment protects students’ online expression.”). 
 188. Williams, supra note 166, at 719 (“[T]he current jurisprudence provides only limited 
guidance to the schools addressing student Internet speech, especially when social networking sites are 
involved.”); see also Lisa M. Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment 
Framework for Educators who seek to Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 635, 640 
(2000) (In dealing with student internet speech containing low value speech, educators are virtually 
limited to two alternatives, creating a “dangerous dilemma”: “The educators can take a threat seriously, 
possibly infringing students’ First Amendment rights, and then become confronted with a lawsuit 
brought by indignant parents.  Alternatively, educators can wait to see if the vociferous, threatening 
student eventually comes to school carrying a handgun, intent on fulfilling his murderous threats.”). 
 189. See Williams, supra note 166, at 722. 
 190. See Hoder, supra note 187, at 1568 (“The current unpredictability in online student speech 
case law has resulted in . . . a plethora of litigation.”). 
 191. Id. at 1600 (“The vague and unpredictable standards currently applied in online student 
speech cases do not give students any guidance on when their expression is beyond the school’s 
reach.”). 
 192. Id. at 1568 (“The current unpredictability in online student speech case law has resulted in a 
lack of fair notice to students, a potential chilling of student Internet use and expression . . . .”); see also 
Williams, supra note 166, at 725 (“[M]ore guidance would enable schools to communicate to students 
and parents the circumstances under which students may be punished for their Internet speech.  Such 
communication benefits schools as well as students and parents.  First, it is likely to discourage students 
from making improper statements or posting improper pictures and persuade parents to more closely 
monitor their children’s Internet speech.  This would limit the occurrence of improper student Internet 
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themselves online; the lack of concrete guidelines thus has a chilling 
effect on the exercise of constitutional rights.  Students also suffer 
because uncertainty results in the punishment of protected speech, a 
problem exacerbated by “school administrators [who] lack a strong 
incentive to protect the free speech rights of their students [as] they are 
more concerned with preserving the integrity of the educational process 
against perceived threats.”193 
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court and the presence 
of confusion in the lower courts, scholars have attempted to define when 
off-campus student internet speech should be subject to punishment by 
school administrators.  The approaches often suggest different methods 
for determining when off-campus internet speech may be considered on-
campus speech subject to the Supreme Court’s traditional framework.  
The first portion of this Part critiques some of these scholarly 
approaches.  The second portion of this Part proposes a new approach, 
which deemphasizes the on-campus/off-campus dichotomy. 
A. Scholarly Approaches to Off-Campus Student Internet Speech 
1. The Student’s Intent Governs 
In his early scholarly foray into student internet speech, Alexander 
Tuneski suggested that the courts “establish a clear rule that off-campus 
speech is not subject to the jurisdiction of school officials.”194  This rule 
requires a clear line between off-campus and on-campus speech.195  
Tuneski suggested drawing “[t]he line between on- and off-campus 
expression . . . based on where the expression originated and how it was 
disseminated.”196  If the speech was created and disseminated off 
campus, the speech could not be regulated by the school.  However, if 
the author of the off-campus speech took “steps to bring the material to a 
school campus,” the speech could be considered on-campus speech 
subject to the school’s authority.197  Affirmative steps to bring the 
speech and decrease the frequency of speech-based punishments.”). 
 193. See Brenton, supra note 58, at 1206; see also Hoder, supra note 187, at 1568, 1597 (“As a 
result of the uncertainty in this area of the law, schools can regulate online speech liberally and without 
the fear of paying damages for a First Amendment violation because, even if a school official violates a 
student’s speech rights, the official will be granted qualified immunity from monetary damages if the 
disciplinary action was ‘objectively reasonable in light of “clearly established” law at the time of the 
violation.’”). 
 194. See Tuneski, supra note 86, at 177. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.; see also Kenneth R. Pike, Comment, Locating the Mislaid Gate: Revitalizing Tinker by 
Repairing Judicial Overgeneralizations of Technologically Enabled Student Speech, 2008 B.Y.U. L. 
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speech on campus include “opening a web page at school, telling others 
to view the site from school, distributing a newspaper as students enter 
school, and sending e-mail to school accounts.”198  If the off-campus 
speech reached campus due to the actions of a third-party and not the 
author of the speech, the speech would still be considered off-campus.199  
Essentially, Tuneski suggests that to determine whether speech occurs 
on or off campus, courts must look “to the objective intent of the speaker 
and whether the student affirmatively acted to bring the speech on-
campus.”200 
In order to determine a student’s intent, another scholar has suggested 
looking at the type of technology used to communicate the message.  
This scholar suggests that the type of technology used by the student can 
be evidence of the student’s intent because “an understanding of 
technology makes it possible to draw analogies between ‘material 
world’ practices and cyber-speech, demonstrating that certain uses of 
technology are more like on-campus speech, while other uses of 
technology more closely resemble true off-campus speech.”201  The 
scholar breaks technology into three separate categories: (1) telephony, 
(2) instant messaging and email, and (3) websites.  Telephony, directly 
calling the school, creates an active, direct presence at the school, which 
would make any such communication on-campus speech.202  Instant 
messaging is similar to using the telephone but in printed form, while 
sending an email to a teacher is comparable to calling the teacher’s 
desk.203  With this in mind, “email and instant messaging should only 
establish an active telepresence where the student engaged in the 
REV. 971, 1007 (“Whether a student can be considered ‘on campus’ for purposes of disciplining their 
expression should depend on whether their expression was intended to directly influence the school 
environment, or whether such influence arose as the incidental result of off-campus expression.”). 
 198. See Tuneski, supra note 86, at 178. 
 199. Id. at 177–78 (“If, however, the off-campus expression reaches the school passively without 
any intentional efforts by the author to disseminate the speech on-campus, schools would be prevented 
from sanctioning the student for the effects of the speech, even if it was reasonably foreseeable that it 
would reach the school.  If the author does not take steps to encourage the dissemination at school, it can 
be presumed that the author intended the speech which originated off-campus to be viewed and received 
off-campus.  Thus, the distinction relies on evidence that the author proactively took steps to have the 
material read or disseminated at school.”) (citations omitted). 
 200. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1149. 
 201. Pike, supra note 197, at 1002 (“[W]e will refer to student use of technology that has the same 
impact as any other off-campus speech as establishing a ‘passive telepresence’—meaning that even if 
the student’s expression has on-campus influence, such influence is not the active or intended result of 
the challenged expression.  The alternative is an ‘active telepresence’ by which a student seeks to 
directly impact the campus environment through remote means.  The hope is that courts can preserve the 
Tinker rendition of the schoolhouse gate, despite the problems posed by ubiquitous information 
technology.”). 
 202. Id. at 1002–03. 
 203. Id. at 1003. 
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challenged expression deliberately transmitted it directly to the school’s 
network.”204  In contrast to the first two modes of communication, a 
website is not sent directly by the author, but rather the information must 
be affirmatively requested by a third party.205  Instead of suggesting that 
a website could never be considered on-campus speech, the scholar 
suggests that the inquiry should be whether the student “‘intend[ed] to 
communicate’ his or her Web site to an audience on campus.”206 
Allowing a student’s intent to govern whether speech is on- or off-
campus speech has two major problems.  The first problem is how to 
determine intent: an objective analysis would consider what a reasonable 
person would think was the student’s intent; a subjective analysis would 
look to what the student in question actually intended.  The second 
problem is that under this standard internet speech that creates a threat of 
violence could go unregulated.  Applying this standard to internet 
statements containing hate messages, “school officials would be 
powerless to take any preventative action against the students based on 
this speech unless those students took affirmative steps to introduce 
[those messages] on-campus.”207  In critical situations, ultimately, 
schools would not have adequate authority to prevent potential calamity. 
2. Applying Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence to Student Internet 
Speech 
A second scholarly approach suggests applying personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence to the student internet speech context.  The key inquiry is 
whether the school’s exercise of jurisdiction over the student’s internet 
speech “is supported by minimum contacts with the school environment 
such that the authority does not offend notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”208 
A court using this test would first determine whether the student’s 
 204. Id. at 1004. 
 205. Id. (“One can create a Web site and post to the Internet without any reference to the school’s 
network, and all it takes to bring the content on campus is for someone on campus to visit the site.  
Because this requires an affirmative request from someone on campus, a Web site could never in itself 
constitute an ‘active telepresence.’”). 
 206. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 166, at 728–31 (suggesting that a student’s decision to set 
their social networking profile to either private or public is a strong suggestion of the student’s intent 
and that “[r]evising and modifying Tinker to factor into consideration the differences between public 
profiles and private profiles [would result] in a standard that both protects student speech rights and 
ensures that the schools are able to maintain order and discipline”). 
 207. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1150 (“For example, prior to the mass shootings at Columbine 
High School in 1999, killers Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold created web pages that were hosted off-
campus and contained ominous statements and hate messages.”). 
 208. See Brenton, supra note 58, at 1231. 
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internet speech had “sufficient minimum contacts with the school 
environment.”209  Under the minimum contacts analysis, minimum 
contacts exist if the internet speech took place on campus.210  
Additionally, if off-campus internet speech had a clear connection with 
the school, the speech may have sufficient minimum contacts with the 
school environment.211  In determining whether the contacts were 
sufficient, the court would have to determine if the students purposefully 
availed themselves of the school environment.212  However, if the 
minimum contacts with the school are based on the unilateral actions of 
a third party, the speech would not fall within the school’s 
jurisdiction.213 
If the student’s internet speech has the required minimum contacts 
with the school, the second inquiry is whether “the school’s exercise of 
authority offends notions of fair play and substantial justice.”214  This 
inquiry would seek to balance the student’s right to free speech against 
the school’s interest in maintaining order.215 
Unfortunately, this approach only provides real guidance for the 
courts.  Using personal jurisdiction, a confusing topic even for law 
students, would require middle and high school students as well as 
school administrators to understand the concept of minimum contacts.  
The complexity of this approach does not fix the lack of Supreme Court 
guidance because students will still not be fully aware of when their 
online speech may be subject to discipline.  With no notice, students will 
still be unable to appropriately censor their online speech to avoid 
 209. Id. at 1234. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1234–35.  When a student’s internet speech is “created off-campus, but has a clear and 
unambiguous connection to the school environment, the court should examine the purported connection 
between the speech and the school to determine whether the student purposefully availed herself of the 
school environment in creating the speech.”  Id. at 1234. 
 212. Id. at 1235. 
Factors that a court should consider in making this determination include whether the 
access happened only once or multiple times; whether the student merely viewed the site 
herself or showed it to others; and the student’s purpose in accessing the site—was it 
accessed in school for a school-related purpose, or merely incidentally during school 
hours? . . . 
  . . . . 
  The second way in which a student might purposefully avail herself of the school 
environment is by intentionally targeting the school environment with an aim to doing 
harm there. 
Id. 
 213. Id. at 1237 (“A student should . . . not be subject to the power of a school to censor speech 
merely because a third party brings that speech inside the schoolhouse gates.”). 
 214. Id. at 1240. 
 215. Id. 
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punishment. 
3. The “Scope of a Student” Analysis 
One scholar proposes borrowing from the realm of public employee 
free speech rights to establish the scope of a student test.216  A public 
employee’s free speech rights are governed by Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
which clarified the test used in previous Supreme Court cases.217  The 
“scope of a student” test’s two prongs are similar in form to the first and 
third prongs of the public employee speech analysis.  First, the role in 
which the individual spoke is considered.  Then, if necessitated by the 
first inquiry, the government’s interests are balanced against the 
speaker’s rights. 
In applying the principles of the public employee free speech doctrine 
to determine if student speech is on-campus or off-campus, the scholar 
first asks whether the speech in question clearly took place on 
campus.218  If there is any doubt that the student speech occurred on 
campus, “then students, school administrators, and courts should ask: 
Did the speech occur within the scope of the speaker’s status as a 
student?”219  In answering this question, the inquiry should be a but-for 
test; in other words, “[b]ut for the fact that the speaker was a student, 
would the speech have occurred?”220 
 216. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1154. 
 217. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  The Supreme Court has established a three-pong test for determining 
when a public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected.  First, the speech must be made as a 
citizen, which means the speech cannot be made pursuant to official employment duties.  Id. at 421.  
Second, the speech must be on a matter of public concern.  Id. at 418.  Third, the court must determine 
whether the government as an employer had grounds for treating the employee differently than the 
general public.  Id. 
 218. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1154. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 1157; see also id. at 1157–58 (“For example, when a student posts a message on his or 
her website that contains derogatory references to his or her principal, the but-for inquiry would be 
answered in the negative: But for the fact that the speaker was a student at the principal’s school, the 
speech would not have occurred.  Thus, the offending speech occurred within the scope of the speaker’s 
status as a student.”).  But see Hoder, supra note 187, at 1594–95 (“[A] school would not have 
jurisdiction over speech just because it relates to the school,” instead “the control and supervision test 
[should be used] to determine school jurisdiction over students’ online speech because it is a temporal 
test and, as a result, it avoids the problem of establishing a geographical location for online speech.”).  
Under this scholar’s proposed test, 
schools would have jurisdiction to regulate only speech that occurs when the school has 
assumed control and supervision over the student who is speaking.  Speech would be 
considered within the school’s authority only when the student accesses and shows the 
online speech to others, or creates the online speech while that student is under the 
assumed control and supervision of the school.  All other online student speech would 
remain outside of the school’s jurisdiction and under the authority of the parent or law 
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If the speech occurred due to the speaker’s status as a student, the 
speech is considered on-campus speech, which the school may 
constitutionally punish based on the traditional student speech 
jurisprudence.221  In comparison, if the speech did not occur within the 
scope of the speaker’s status as a student, “the speech should be treated 
as off-campus speech” and presumed to be constitutionally protected.222  
However, the school does not completely lose its ability to regulate 
student speech when it occurs off campus.223  If the speech is off-
campus speech the scope of the student test requires a determination 
regarding “whether the school has a legitimate justification to infringe 
on the student speaker’s First Amendment rights.”224  This burden will 
likely only be met if the school attempts to regulate a category of speech 
that traditionally falls outside the protection of the First Amendment.225 
While the scope of the student test provides a unique approach to the 
on-campus/off-campus dichotomy, it fails to provide any meaningful 
protection for students’ First Amendment rights.  The inquiry into 
whether the speech would have occurred but-for the speaker being a 
student turns any off-campus speech tangentially related to the school 
into on-campus speech.  Although the inquiry is tied to the student’s 
status and choices regarding speech, the standard creates a threshold that 
is too low.  This proposed standard overvalues the need for 
administrative guidance and devalues the student’s constitutional rights. 
4. Eliminate the On-Campus/Off-Campus Distinction 
One scholar has boldly proposed eliminating the on-campus/off-
campus distinction when dealing with student internet speech because 
the distinction is riddled with inherent flaws.226  First, the lower courts 
are fractured regarding an appropriate standard for determining when 
speech that occurs off campus can be considered on-campus speech.227  
Due to the lack of a consistent standard, some courts have so broadly 
enforcement to regulate. 
Id. at 1594–95 (citations omitted). 
 221. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1154.  If the speech occurred within the scope of the speaker’s 
status as a student, “the speech should be treated as on-campus speech, and school administrators should 
be able to impose reasonable censorship or punishment based on the three standards articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood.”  Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1158. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Li, supra note 3, at 92–93. 
 227. Id. at 92. 
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defined when off-campus speech constitutes on-campus speech that they 
have virtually destroyed any meaningful distinction between the two.228  
Finally, the distinction fails to take into account the unique nature of the 
internet.  As a “borderless medium,” the internet contains significant 
distinctions from traditional mediums of expression.229 
In light of the unique nature and pervasiveness of the internet, the 
scholar proposes a new standard that attempts to balance the two 
competing interests at play: “protecting a student’s individual free 
speech rights and protecting schools from violent student behavior.”230  
This proposed standard only applies to student internet speech that does 
not bear the imprimatur of the school.231  In those cases, the Fraser and 
Hazelwood standards should apply.232  “Once a court determines 
that . . . Fraser and Hazelwood . . . do not apply,” it must decide, given 
the totality of the circumstances, “whether the speech constitutes a true 
threat under the reasonable speaker approach,”233 which is a fact 
intensive inquiry.  If the speech does not constitute a true threat, the 
court should apply the Tinker test.234  Ultimately, this approach is 
similar to the approach taken by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Blue Mountain School District and allows all internet speech to be 
regulated under Tinker. 
The problem with this approach is that all internet speech is subject to 
Tinker, an analysis which has lost much if not all of its bite.235  If all 
 228. Id.  “Additionally, although courts generally protect off-campus speech, the standards are so 
malleable that a court could possibly justify punishing a student even if the speech actually occurred off-
campus.”  Id. at 93. 
 229. Id. at 93.  “The Internet differs from other traditional mediums of expression, such as flyers, 
newspapers, and public speeches, for several reasons: (1) it is pervasive, (2) it allows users to 
disseminate information to millions of people immediately and easily, and (3) it can be accessed 
anywhere.”  Id. 
 230. Id. at 97. 
 231. Id. at 98.  “[I]t is important to emphasize that this new standard should only apply to Internet-
related student speech cases that do not involve school-sponsored events or activities.” 
 232. Id.  “However, if the school sponsors the Internet-related student speech or includes it as part 
of a school-sponsored activity, then the Fraser and Kuhlmeier standards should apply, and schools 
should be able to exercise control over the activities they sponsor.”  Id. 
 233. Id. at 99. 
[A] court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the listeners’ 
reactions, the speaker’s intentions, the school’s reaction, and whether the threats sound 
equivocal.  When looking at the speaker’s intentions, a court should consider several 
factors: the student’s academic standing, the student’s level of social activity, the 
student’s psychological history, and the student’s willingness and promptness to remove 
the Internet speech in question. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 234. Id. 
 235. “Unfortunately, most courts that apply the Tinker standard are far too deferential to the 
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internet speech is subject to a substantial disruption test, it seems 
“school officials with an axe to grind over the disrespectful commentary 
of immature, ungrateful students” receive the primary benefits.236  By 
giving schools such broad authority, students are likely to be punished 
for constitutionally protected speech.  Consider Avery Doninger, who 
referred to the administration as “douchebags”: courts are upholding 
punishments for what is essentially name-calling under Tinker’s 
substantial disruption test.237  Allowing speech such as Doninger’s to be 
punished under Tinker ignores the fact that the speech is student 
criticism that, while not proper or eloquent, “encourages improvement in 
the educational process.”238  This problem is exacerbated by the 
deference courts give to the decisions of school officials.239 
B. A New Approach: Allowing Schools to Regulate Off-Campus Internet 
Speech if the School has a Compelling Interest 
Up to now, courts and scholars have failed to provide a workable 
standard for addressing a school’s ability to punish student internet 
speech.  The inability of courts and scholars to provide a framework 
stems from using the on-campus/off-campus dichotomy to determine 
whether a school can regulate student internet speech.  This Part 
provides a new mode of analysis, which deemphasizes the on-
campus/off-campus dichotomy.  If the student internet speech is 
schools’ claims that the speech at issue caused a reasonable fear of substantial disruption . . . courts 
generally permit the unreasonable reaction of teachers and school officials to constitute a disturbance.”  
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1067 (2008) 
(citation omitted).  “The lower courts are all over the map in the way in which they apply Tinker’s 
requirement that the expression cause a material-and-substantial disruption or interfere with the rights of 
others.”  Id. at 1065.  “Some courts conclude that Tinker’s material-and-substantial disruption standard 
is met when other students distribute, read, and react to the material at issue, or even when only the 
school administration reacts to the speech.”  Id. 
 236. See Pike, supra note 197, at 1000. 
 237. See supra notes 125, 140–141 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Pike, supra note 197, at 999. 
 239. See Papandrea, supra note 235, at 1054 (“[T]he Court’s increasing deference to school 
administrators indicates that the Court is willing to give schools wide berth when it comes to 
disciplining their students for their expression, regardless of which medium they use.”); see also Sean R. 
Nuttall, Note, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1282, 1293–94 (2008) (“[T]he Tinker standard actually mandates deference to the reasonable 
decisions of educators as to the likelihood of disruption and provides only very modest protection for 
student speech.”); Adrianne Mittelstaedt, Note, Dressing up a Constitutional Issue: First Amendment 
Protection of School Uniform Protests in Lowry v. Watson Chapel School District and the Threads 
Remaining to Enforce School Policies, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 609, 644–45 (2009) (“The underlying 
policy of [the Supreme Court’s cases following Tinker] represents judicial deference to school officials, 
with intervention being appropriate only when the regulation lacks a viewpoint-neutral pedagogical 
purpose.”). 
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considered on-campus speech, the school may punish the speech under 
existing Supreme Court student speech jurisprudence.  However, if the 
student internet speech is deemed off-campus, the school may regulate 
the speech if their compelling interest outweighs the student’s interest in 
his or her First Amendment rights. 
1. Establishing a New Standard 
As an initial matter, this new framework requires a mode of 
determining whether student internet speech can be considered on-
campus speech.  Because this determination will not prohibit school 
districts from regulating student internet speech, the method used should 
be the most student-protective standard possible.240  With this in mind, 
the student speaker’s intent should be used to determine whether his or 
her internet speech is on- or off-campus speech.241  This analysis should 
not be based on the student’s subjective intent, as actual intent would be 
difficult to determine,242 but instead the analysis should be objective.243  
An objective analysis should ask whether a reasonable person would 
believe, given the circumstances surrounding the student’s speech, 
including the mode of technology used244 and any steps taken to ensure 
the privacy of the speech,245 that the student intended to guarantee his 
speech reached the school.  If the answer is yes, the speech is deemed 
on-campus speech subject to the Supreme Court’s existing student 
speech jurisprudence.  If the answer is no, then the school and the court 
should engage in the balancing test discussed below. 
If a student’s internet speech cannot objectively be said to have been 
deliberately sent into the school’s purview, a presumption arises that the 
speech is protected by the First Amendment.246  The school has the 
burden of showing a compelling interest in punishing the speech that 
outweighs the student’s interest in the constitutional right to freedom of 
speech.247  Additionally, schools retain the ability to punish off-campus 
 240. Another reason for a student protective inquiry is the expansion of the school’s jurisdiction to 
off-campus speech. 
 241. See supra notes 200–207 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Hoder, supra note 187, at 1595 (“A student’s intent should not be the definitive test, 
because it is difficult to prove a student’s actual subjective intent.”). 
 243. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 201–206 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra note 206. 
 246. See Williams, supra note 166, at 728 (“[W]hen student Internet speech occurs off-
campus . . . schools and courts should presume the speech is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 247. This approach is similar to the balancing test originally used in the public employee free 
speech context, but its application is more stringent by requiring the school to have a compelling interest 
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internet speech that falls outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.248 
While a comprehensive list of compelling interests is beyond the 
scope of this Comment, the spirit of the Supreme Court’s student speech 
jurisprudence provides guidance regarding what would qualify as such 
an interest.  For example, the spirit of Tinker recognizes that schools are 
justified in preventing violence at their facilities.  Therefore, if it were 
reasonably foreseeable that the off-campus student internet speech 
would cause violence at the school, the school would have a compelling 
interest in preventing the violence.  Collectively, Bethel, Hazelwood, 
and Morse stand for the principle that schools may take steps to regulate 
inappropriate speech when such speech is or seems to be closely 
associated with the school.  Therefore, if the off-campus student internet 
speech actually bore the imprimatur of the school, the school would 
have a compelling interest in disassociating itself with such speech.249  
In other words, if a student created a webpage that contained the school 
district’s official emblem as well as inappropriate language, the school 
would have a compelling interest in disassociating itself from the 
speech.250 
2. Allowing Schools to Expand Their Reach Beyond the Schoolhouse 
Gates 
The internet provides new technology for students to express 
grievances that prior generations expressed without technology.251  
While students have gossiped about teachers and fellow students for 
decades, the mode of communication has changed from face-to-face 
conversations to sending e-mails and instant messages.252  These new 
in regulating the speech.  See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (The Court recognized the need “to arrive at a balance between the interests of 
the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”).  However, this approach is more lenient in its application than the balancing test set forth 
by the scope of the student test.  See supra notes 224–225 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 249. This approach goes further than the approach taken by the scholar who proposed eliminating 
the on-campus/off-campus distinction.  Under that scholar’s proposal, “if the school sponsors the 
Internet-related student speech or includes it as part of a school-sponsored activity, then the Fraser and 
Kuhlmeier standards should apply, and schools should be able to exercise control over the activities they 
sponsor.”  See Li, supra note 3, at 98. 
 250. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (“[T]hese cases . . . recognize that 
deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important-indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest.” (quoting 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995))). 
 251. Papandrea, supra note 235, at 1036. 
 252. Id. at 1036–37. 
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means of communication make it easier for adults to see what minors are 
saying.253  In light of these changes, a new issue has arisen: if the 
content of the speech is similar, then why should the mode of 
communication used alter the school’s ability to punish speech?  
Ultimately, just as technology has changed, so have many of the legal 
circumstances that justify allowing schools to regulate off-campus 
internet speech. 
Expanding school jurisdiction to off-campus internet speech may 
seem like a drastic step; however, allowing schools to regulate off-
campus behavior is not a novel concept.  State legislation demonstrates 
the growing trend in allowing schools to punish off-campus behavior.  
States already allow certain off-campus activities to be regulated.254  
One scholar has pointed out, that states statutorily authorize school 
disciplinary action for students who commit crimes or who participate in 
activities that endanger the school environment, even if the conduct took 
place off campus.255 
Courts have acknowledged and played a more active role in 
recognizing a school’s right to regulate off-campus behavior to the 
extent that “some courts are now upholding schools’ decisions to punish 
certain student speech originating off-campus.”256  For example, in Blue 
Mountain School District, the Third Circuit created a categorical 
exception allowing all internet speech to be regulated under Tinker.257  
This trend recognizes that even though speech originates off-campus, 
internet speech is more transferable and can still impact the school, 
which justifies punishment.258  In other words, while the speech may 
still contain a grievance about a teacher, internet speech, unlike face-to-
face conversations, creates a permanent record of the speech that can be 
transferred to the school environment, thereby making it more likely to 
reach and affect the school environment. 
Additionally, schools and courts have become acutely aware of the 
effect violence can have on the school environment.  The threat of 
violence has been a motivating factor used by the courts to expand the 
 253. Id. at 1037. 
 254. Pike, supra note 197, at 977; see also Hoder, supra note 187, at 1604 (“[S]tatutes in many 
states allow a school to suspend a student who is charged with a felony committed on or off campus, and 
expel a student who is convicted of a felony if the school administrator determines that ‘the student’s 
continued presence in school would have a substantial detrimental effect on the general welfare of the 
school.’” (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37H1/2 (1996))). 
 255. Pike, supra note 197, at 977. 
 256. May, supra note 4, at 1129. 
 257. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 
reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 258. May, supra note 4, at 1129. 
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school’s jurisdiction off campus.259  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has recognized that “in this day and age where school 
violence is becoming more commonplace, school officials are justified 
in taking threats . . . seriously.”260  The need to prevent violence is 
accentuated by the occurrence of tragedies such as school shootings,261 
and by “[c]hildren’s constant exposure to violent images on television, 
video games, and movies.”262  Allowing schools to regulate off-campus 
student internet speech when the speech is indicative of violence ensures 
that schools can take preventative measures to avoid a possible 
massacre. 
Finally, allowing off-campus internet speech to be regulated by the 
schools helps reduce the impact the technological generation gap has on 
the constitutionality of student internet speech.  Today’s generation is 
“completely connected to, and dependent on, the Internet.”263  This 
generational gap in internet use and understanding appears in court 
decisions where judges fail to understand the internet as a forum, which 
“hinders a court from fully assessing the purpose and intended audience 
of the student’s speech.”264  By allowing courts to regulate off-campus 
speech, the inability to properly understand the internet is deemphasized, 
especially because the ultimate question does not depend on the answer 
to an on-campus/off-campus distinction laden with technological 
complexities. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “First Amendment rights 
apply differently in different situations, for example the school 
environment.”265  The internet must be accepted as a special situation.266  
 259. See supra notes 87–88, 164 and accompanying text. 
 260. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 853 (Pa. 2002). 
 261. See Williams, supra note 166, at 723 (“[M]any public schools argue, and many courts agree, 
that following the tragedies at Columbine High School and other schools throughout the country, 
schools are in an ‘acutely difficult position’ to prevent violent statements from resulting in violent 
actions.”); see also Seminski, supra note 1, at 169–70 (“Some educators and legal scholars aver that 
these are merely isolated incidents.  As time has proven, however, the fact is that these occurrences are 
more than isolated incidents and such dangerous Internet-related conduct is not limited to only these 
deadly threats.”) (citations omitted); Hoder, supra note 187, at 1566 (“An increase in school violence 
and a number of highly publicized student suicides have highlighted the problem of abusive online 
activity by students and put pressure on legislatures and school officials to pass tougher laws and 
implement stricter discipline policies to punish cyberbullying.”). 
 262. Li, supra note 3, at 66. 
 263. May, supra note 4, at 1127.  The “[s]tudent’s frequent and skilled Internet use stands . . . in 
stark contrast to adults’ and educators’ Internet use.”  Id. 
 264. Id. at 1127–28. 
 265. Seminski, supra note 1, at 183; see also Hoder, supra note 187, at 1603 (“The primary 
justifications given by the Supreme Court for affording students only limited First Amendment rights are 
that: (1) public schools are not traditional public forums and, as a result, a school’s inaction may be 
interpreted by the community as the school’s endorsement of a student’s speech, and (2) schools have a 
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In the modern world, allowing schools to punish off-campus student 
internet speech is a necessary and proper analytical tool, which will 
provide increased protection for student free speech. 
3. The Need for a Compelling Interest Standard 
When student internet speech takes place off campus, it “normally 
does not implicate the ‘special characteristics of the school 
environment.’”267  For one reason, recipients of off-campus internet 
speech are not a captive audience268 as are students whose attendance at 
school is mandated by law.269  Therefore, if schools are allowed to 
regulate off-campus speech, a test needs to be implemented that properly 
balances the interests of all parties involved.  Requiring schools to 
justify punishment of off-campus student internet speech with a 
compelling interest for doing so properly balances these interests. 
First, the compelling interest test places a high burden on the school 
to overcome the presumption that a student’s off-campus speech is 
protected by the First Amendment.  The compelling interest test fixes 
the infirmities associated with applying Tinker to off-campus internet 
speech.  Tinker’s substantial disruption and material interference 
standard has become severely watered down because of the deference 
courts give to school administrators and their determinations of what 
constitutes a disruption.270  A compelling interest test restores crucial 
protection to student speech while allowing schools to regulate violent 
speech, which was the justification for applying Tinker to off-campus 
speech.271  The compelling interest test eliminates the weaknesses of 
Tinker while addressing the concerns behind the decision.  For example, 
student internet speech discussing the desire to kill a teacher could be 
regulated under both Tinker and the compelling interest test in order to 
prevent violence.  In contrast, speech discussing the perceived 
inadequacies of a teacher in derogatory terms, which could result in 
legal, professional, and ethical duty to maintain control and protect students in the school 
environment.”) (citation omitted). 
 266. Seminski, supra note 1, at 183. 
 267. May, supra note 4, at 1138. 
 268. See Papandrea, supra note 235, at 1088 (“When it comes to digital media . . . it becomes 
much more difficult to conclude that students are forced—aside from perhaps peer pressure—to view 
their classmates’ speech.”); see also Williams, supra note 166, at 714 (“Unlike students gathered at an 
assembly as in Fraser, student Internet users are not a captive audience.”). 
 269. See Papandrea, supra note 235, at 1088 (“In classrooms and at other school events students 
are required to attend, they might be properly considered a ‘captive audience,’ which might warrant 
some limitations on their classmates’ expressive rights that would otherwise not be tolerated.”). 
 270. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text. 
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regulation under Tinker based on a potential disruption of the learning 
environment, would be protected under the compelling interest test.  
Such a test also eliminates a weakness of the true threat doctrine, which 
places a high burden on the school by requiring a showing that the 
student intended his speech to be a threat.272  In the example previously 
discussed, the student’s desire to kill a teacher would likely go 
unregulated under the true threat analysis because the student did not 
intend the speech to be a threat. 
Restricting a school’s ability to punish off-campus speech pursuant to 
a compelling interest also protects the education system.  With the ease 
of regulating speech under Tinker, a vast number of school resources 
would be consumed regulating off-campus speech, placing a significant 
strain on the school’s resources.273  Without curtailing the regulation of 
off-campus speech, schools are unable to focus on their primary 
purpose—preparing students for citizenship and teaching them how to 
thrive in republican government274—to the desired extent.  If school 
administrators focus too much on regulating speech and not on teaching 
inside the classrooms, lessons will suffer. 
Requiring a school to proffer a compelling interest before regulating 
off-campus student speech places a check on the school’s discretion.  It 
also ensures that school administrators and judges, who are often out of 
touch with young society, are not attempting to use the First Amendment 
to create a society molded in their vision.275  A compelling interest 
standard helps bridge this generation gap by preventing such individuals 
from using the First Amendment “to force-feed good manners to the 
ruffians.”276  At the same time, a compelling interest standard allows 
schools to address real, violent threats to the school, which has been a 
 272. See May, supra note 4, at 1134–35 (“[T]o prove the student’s speech was a ‘true threat,’ a 
school must provide some evidence demonstrating that the student intended and was capable of 
communicating a threat.”). 
 273. See Pike, supra note 197, at 998. 
 274. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); see also Nuttall, supra 
note 239, at 1318 (“Protecting children’s speech rights and encouraging their exercise is critical to the 
continued vitality of a liberal democratic state.”). 
 275. See Li, supra note 3, at 90–91 (“Accentuating this judicial misconception is the generation 
gap between judges and students—many judges do not understand popular culture and thus are unable to 
grasp the student’s perspective.  Two law professors have argued that judges are so generationally 
removed from popular teen culture that they have difficulty understanding the culture.  Instead of 
recognizing that teens are immersed in this culture and are inundated with violent and profane imagery 
every day, judges are focused on uncommon, tragic events like Columbine.  For example, Eminem, a 
popular rap artist among teenagers, has produced songs that contain ‘violent, misogynistic, and 
homophobic lyrics,’ and yet he has sold millions of albums.  Judges need to remember that children are 
impressionable and that although their speech may at times appear crude and even violent, they are 
really imitating artists such as Eminem or popular teen culture in general.”) (citations omitted). 
 276. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (D. Me. 1986). 
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justification for applying Tinker to off-campus speech.277 
V. CONCLUSION 
The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court has created chaos in the 
lower courts and in scholarship regarding the ability of schools to deal 
with off-campus student internet speech.  This chaos inhibits schools, 
parents, and students from complying with the First Amendment.  As a 
result, student speech that falls within the protection of the First 
Amendment is nonetheless being punished.  Additionally, schools, 
parents, and students are needlessly wasting money and time litigating 
cases that could be avoided if a clear standard were readily apparent. 
This Comment puts forth a new standard that addresses some of the 
weaknesses created by the current state of the law.  Under this proposed 
standard, the initial inquiry remains the same: does the student internet 
speech in question fall into the category of on-campus speech subject to 
the Supreme Court’s traditional student speech jurisprudence?  This 
question is answered by looking at the objective intent of the student 
author, which is the most speech protective mode of analysis.  If the 
student internet speech cannot objectively be considered on-campus 
speech, it is off-campus speech and presumptively protected by the First 
Amendment.  A student’s off-campus internet speech can be punished 
by the school in two ways.  First, the school can punish speech that is 
traditionally unprotected by the First Amendment.  Second, the school 
can punish speech if the school can articulate a compelling interest that 
outweighs the student’s interest in freedom of speech.  This new 
approach enables school districts to prevent violence on their campuses 
by monitoring student internet speech, but also ensures that parental and 
student rights are not violated.  In the presence of chaos, this approach 
adequately balances the interests of all parties involved. 
 277. See supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text. 
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